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Abstract—Many micro-architectural attacks rely on the ca-
pability of an attacker to efficiently find small eviction sets:
groups of virtual addresses that map to the same cache set.
This capability has become a decisive primitive for cache side-
channel, rowhammer, and speculative execution attacks. Despite
their importance, algorithms for finding small eviction sets have
not been systematically studied in the literature.
In this paper, we perform such a systematic study. We begin
by formalizing the problem and analyzing the probability that
a set of random virtual addresses is an eviction set. We then
present novel algorithms, based on ideas from threshold group
testing, that reduce random eviction sets to their minimal core
in linear time, improving over the quadratic state-of-the-art.
We complement the theoretical analysis of our algorithms with
a rigorous empirical evaluation in which we identify and isolate
factors that affect their reliability in practice, such as adaptive
cache replacement strategies and TLB thrashing. Our results
indicate that our algorithms enable finding small eviction sets
much faster than before, and under conditions where this was
previously deemed impractical.
I. INTRODUCTION
Attacks against the micro-architecture of modern CPUs have
rapidly evolved from an academic stunt to a powerful tool
in the hand of real-world adversaries. Prominent examples
of attacks include side-channel attacks against shared CPU
caches [1], fault injection attacks against DRAM [2], and
covert channel attacks that leak information from speculative
executions [3].
A key requirement for many of the documented attacks is
that the adversary be able to bring specific cache sets into
a controlled state. For example, flush+reload [1] attacks use
special instructions to invalidate targeted cache content (like
clflush on x86), for which they require privileged execution
and shared memory space. Another class of attacks, called
prime+probe, evicts cache content by replacing it with new
content and can be performed without privileges from user
space or from a sandbox.
The primitive used for replacing cache content is called
an eviction set. Technically, an eviction set is a collection of
(virtual) addresses that contains at least as many elements that
map to a specific cache set as the cache has ways. The intuition
is that, when accessed, an eviction set clears all previous
content from the cache set. Eviction sets enable an adversary
to (1) bring specific cache sets into a controlled state; and to
(2) probe whether this state has been modified by the victim,
by measuring latency of accesses to the eviction set.
Accessing a large enough set of virtual addresses is suf-
ficient for evicting any content from the cache. However,
such large eviction sets increase the time required for evicting
and probing, and they introduce noise due to the unnecessary
memory accesses. For targeted and stealthy eviction of cache
content one hence seeks to identify eviction sets of minimal
size, which is fundamental, for example, for
• fine-grained monitoring of memory usage by a concurrent
process in timing attacks against last-level caches [4], [5];
• enforcing that memory accesses hit DRAM instead of
the cache with high enough frequency to flip bits in
rowhammer attacks [6];and
• increasing the number of instructions that are specula-
tively executed by ensuring that branch guards are not
cached [3].
Computing minimal eviction sets is recognized as a chal-
lenging problem, equivalent to learning the mapping from vir-
tual addresses to cache sets [4]. The difficulty of the problem
is governed by the amount of control the adversary has over
the bits of physical addresses. For example, on bare metal,
the adversary completely controls the mapping to cache sets;
on huge pages, it controls the mapping to cache sets within
each cache slice, but not the mapping to slices; on regular 4KB
pages, it only partially controls the mapping to sets within each
slice; and on sandboxed or hardened environments it may not
have any control over the mapping at all [7], [5].
Several approaches in the literature discuss algorithms for
finding minimal eviction sets, see Section VII for an overview.
These algorithms rely on a two-step approach in which one
first collects a large enough set of addresses that is an eviction
set, and then successively reduces this set to its minimal core.
Unfortunately, these algorithms are usually only considered
as a means to another end, such as devising a novel attack.
As a consequence, they still lack an in-depth analysis in
terms of complexity, real-time performance, correctness, and
scope, which hinders progress in research on attacks and on
principled countermeasures at the same time.
Our approach: In this paper we perform the first system-
atic study of finding minimal eviction sets as an algorithmic
problem. In our study we proceed as follows:
• We give the first formalization and analysis of the pro-
blem of finding eviction sets. We study different variants of
the problem, corresponding to different goals, for example,
“evicting a specific cache set”, and “evicting an arbitrary cache
set”. For these goals, we express the probability that a set of
virtual addresses is an eviction set as a function of its size.
The function exhibits that a small set of virtual addresses is
unlikely to be an eviction set, but that the likelihood grows fast
with the set size. This analysis justifies the two-step approach
taken in the literature for computing minimal eviction sets,
and it exhibits favorable set sizes to start the reduction.
• We design novel algorithms for finding minimal evic-
tion sets. The basis of our algorithms are tests from the
literature [4] that use the cache side-channel as an oracle
to determine whether a given set of virtual addresses is an
eviction set. The key observation underlying our algorithms
is that these tests can be seen as so-called threshold group
tests [8]. This observation allows us to leverage ideas from the
group testing literature for computing minimal eviction sets.
We show that the resulting algorithm reduces an eviction set of
size n to its minimal core using only O(n) memory accesses,
which improves over the current O(n2) state-of-the-art [9].
• We perform a rigorous reliability analysis of our algo-
rithms on Intel’s Haswell and Skylake microarchitectures. In
our analysis, we identify ways to isolate the influence of TLBs
and cache replacement policies. This allows us to exhibit
conditions under which our algorithms are almost perfectly
reliable, as well as conditions under which their reliability
degrades.
• We carry out a performance analysis of our algorithms
on Intel Skylake. Our analysis shows that the execution time
of our algorithms indeed grows only linearly in practice,
which leads to significant speed-up compared to the exist-
ing quadratic algorithms. While previous approaches rely on
assumptions about the number of controlled physical bits
(provided by huge and regular pages), our algorithms enable,
for first time, computing eviction sets in scenarios without any
control of the mapping from virtual addresses to cache sets,
as in [7], [5].
Summary of contributions: Our contributions are both
theoretical and practical. On the theoretical side, we formalize
the problem of finding minimal eviction sets and devise novel
algorithms that improve the state-of-the-art from quadratic to
linear. On the practical side, we perform a rigorous empirical
analysis that exhibits the conditions under which our algo-
rithms succeed or fail. Overall, our insights provide a basis
for principled countermeasures against, or paths for further
improving the robustness of, algorithms for finding eviction
sets.
We also include a tool for evaluating, on different platforms,
all tests and algorithms presented in this paper:
https://github.com/cgvwzq/evsets
II. A PRIMER ON CACHING AND VIRTUAL MEMORY
In this section we provide the necessary background and
notation used along the paper.
A. Caches
Caches are fast but small memories that bridge the latency
gap between the CPU and main memory. To profit from spatial
locality and to reduce management overhead, main memory is
logically partitioned into a set of blocks. Each block is cached
as a whole in a cache line of the same size. When accessing
a block, the cache logic has to determine whether the block is
stored in the cache (a cache hit) or not (a cache miss). For this
purpose, caches are partitioned into equally sized cache sets.
The size or number of lines of cache sets is called associativity
a (or ways) of the cache.
Cache Replacement Policies: Since the cache is much
smaller than main memory, a replacement policy must decide
which memory block to evict upon a cache miss. Tradi-
tional replacement policies include least-recently used (LRU),
pseudo-LRU (PLRU), and first-in first-out (FIFO). In modern
microarchitectures, replacement policies are often more com-
plex and generally not documented. For example, recent Intel
CPUs rely on replacement policies [10], [11] that dynamically
adapt to the workload.
Cache Hierarchies: Modern CPU caches are organized
in multiple levels, with small and fast lower-level caches per
CPU core, and a larger but slower last-level cache (LLC) that
is shared among different cores. The relationship between the
content of different cache levels is governed by an inclusion
policy. Intel caches, for instance, are usually inclusive. This
means that the content of higher level caches (L1 and L2) is
always a subset of the LLC’s. In particular, blocks that are
evicted from the LLC are also invalidated in higher levels. In
this paper we focus on inclusive LLCs.
Mapping Memory Blocks to Cache Sets: The mapping of
main memory content to the cache sets of a LLC is determined
by the content’s physical address. For describing this mapping,
consider an architecture with n-bit physical addresses, cache
lines of 2ℓ bytes, and 2c cache sets. The least significant ℓ
bits of a physical address y = (bn−1, . . . , b0) form the line
offset that determines the position within a cache line. Bits
(bc+ℓ−1, . . . , bℓ) of y are the set index bits that determine the
cache set, and we denote them by set(y). The most significant
n−ℓ−c bits form the tag of y. See Figure 1 for a visualization
of the role of address bits on a Intel Skylake machine.
Cache Slicing: Modern Intel CPUs partition the LLC into
different 2s many slices, typically one or two per CPU core.
The slice is determined by an undocumented s-bit hash of the
most significant n− ℓ bits of the address. With slicing, the c
set index bits only determine the cache set within each slice.
The total cache size |M | = 2s+c+ℓa is then determined as
the product of the number of slices, the number of cache sets
per slice, the size of each line, and the associativity.
B. Virtual Memory
Virtual memory is an abstraction of the storage resources of
a process that provides a linear memory space isolated from
other processes and larger than the physically available re-
sources. Operating systems, with help from the CPU’s memory
management unit (MMU), take care of the translation of virtual
addresses to physical addresses.
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Fig. 1: Mapping from physical addresses to cache sets for
Intel Skylake LLC, with 4 cores, 8 slices (s = 3), 1024
cache sets per slice (c = 10), lines of 64 bytes (ℓ = 6), and
associativity a = 12. The figure also displays page offsets and
frame numbers for 4KB pages (p = 12) and 2MB huge pages
(p = 21). The set index bits that are not part of the page offset
determine the page color.
Virtual Address Translation: Physical memory is parti-
tioned in pages of size 2p. Common page sizes are 4KB (i.e.
p = 12), or 2MB for huge pages1 (i.e. p = 21).
We model the translation from virtual to physical ad-
dresses as a function pt that acts as the identity on the least
significant p bits (named page offset) of a virtual address
x = (x48, . . . , x0). That is, the virtual and physical addresses
coincide on (xp−1, . . . , x0). pt maps the most significant
48−p bits, named virtual page number (VPN), to the physical
frame number (PFN). We discuss how pt acts on these bits
in Section III-C. Figure 1 includes a visualization of the page
offsets and physical frame numbers for small and huge pages,
respectively.
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Fig. 2: Page walk on a 64-bit system with four levels of
page tables: PageMap Level 4, Page Directory Pointer, Page
Directory, and Page Table for 4KB pages, respectively. 2MB
huge pages can be implemented by using a PD Entry directly
as PT Entry. CPU’s Control Register 3 (CR3) points to the
PML4 of the running process.
Implementing Virtual Address Translation: Operating
systems keep track of the virtual-to-physical mapping using
a radix tree structure called page table (PT) that is capable of
storing the required information efficiently. Whenever a virtual
address is accessed, the MMU traverses the PT until it finds the
corresponding physical address. This process, also known as a
page walk, is illustrated in Figure 2. The bits of the VPN are
divided into 9-bit indexes for each level of the PT, which can
1See Appendix A for a discussion of the availability of huge pages on
different operation systems.
store up to 512 entries (of 8 bytes each). To avoid performing
a page walk for each memory access, each CPU core has a
translation lookaside buffer (TLB) that stores the most recent
translations. A page walk only occurs after a TLB miss.
III. EVICTION SETS
In this section we give the first formalization of eviction
sets, and present tests that enable determining whether a
given set of addresses is an eviction set. We then express the
probability that a set of random addresses forms an eviction
set as a function of its size. The development of this section
forms the basis for the algorithms we develop, and for their
evaluation.
A. Defining Eviction Sets
We say that two virtual addresses x and y are congruent,
denoted by x ≃ y, if they map to the same cache set. This is
the case if and only if the set index bits set(·) and slice bits
slice(·) of their respective physical addresses pt(x) and pt(y)
coincide. That is, x ≃ y if and only if:
set(pt(x)) = set(pt(y)) ∧ slice(pt(x)) = slice(pt(y)) (1)
Congruence is an equivalence relation. The equivalence class
[x] of x w.r.t. ≃ is the set of virtual addresses that maps to
the same cache set as x. We say that addresses are partially
congruent if they satisfy the first term of Equation (1), i.e.,
they coincide on the set index bits but not necessarily on the
slice bits.
We now give definitions of eviction sets, where we dis-
tinguish between two goals: In the first, we seek to evict a
specific address from the cache. This is relevant, for example,
to perform precise flushing in rowhammer attacks. In the
second, we seek to evict the content of an arbitrary cache
set. This is relevant, for example, for high bandwidth covert
channels, where one seeks to control a large number of cache
sets, but does not care about which ones.
Definition 1. We say that a set of virtual addresses S is
• an eviction set for x if x 6∈ S and at least a addresses in
S map to the same cache set as x:
|[x] ∩ S| ≥ a
• an eviction set (for an arbitrary address) if there exists
x ∈ S such that S \ {x} is an eviction set for x:
∃x : |[x] ∩ S| ≥ a + 1
The intuition behind Definition 1 is that sequentially access-
ing all elements of an eviction set for x will ensure that x is
not cached afterwards. Likewise, sequentially accessing a +1
congruent elements will guarantee that at least one of them is
being evicted.
For this intuition to hold, the cache replacement policy
needs to satisfy a condition, namely that a sequence of
a misses to a cache set evicts all previous content. This
condition is satisfied, for example, by all permutation-based
policies [12], which includes LRU, FIFO, and PLRU. How-
ever, the condition is only partially satisfied by modern (i.e.
3
ava0 a1 ... an-1av
Test 1: Eviction test for a specific address av: (1) Access av.
(2) Access S = {a0, . . . , an−1}. (3) Access av . If the time for
(3) is larger than a threshold, then S is an eviction set for av.
a0 a1 ... an-1
Test 2: Eviction test for an arbitrary address: (1) Access S =
{a0, . . . , an−1}. (2) Access S again. If the overall time for (2)
is above a threshold, S is an eviction set.
post Sandy Bridge) Intel CPUs. See Section VI for a more
detailed discussion.
B. Testing Eviction Sets
Identifying eviction sets based on Definition 1 involves
checking whether (1) holds. This requires access to bits of the
physical addresses and cannot be performed by user programs.
In this section we present tests that rely on a timing side-
channel to determine whether a set of virtual addresses is an
eviction set.
• Test 1 from [4], [5] enables user programs to check
whether S is an eviction set for a specific virtual address
av. The test relies on the assumption that a program can
determine whether av is cached or not. In practice, this is
possible whenever a program has access to a clock that enables
it to distinguish between a cache hit or a miss.
Test 1 can also be used as a basis for testing whether a set S is
an eviction set for an arbitrary address, by running TEST(S \
{ai}, ai), for all ai ∈ S, and reporting any positive outcome.
However, the number of memory accesses required for this is
quadratic in the size of S.
• Test 2 is a more efficient solution that has been informally
discussed in [5]. The idea is to iterate over all the elements of
S twice, and measure the overall time of the second iteration.
The first iteration ensures that all elements are cached. If the
time for the second iteration is above a certain threshold, one
of the elements has been evicted from the cache, showing
that S is an eviction set. The downside of Test 2 is that it
is susceptible to noise, in the sense that any delay introduced
during the second iteration will result in a positive answer.
• We propose Test 3 as a variant of Test 2, drawing
inspiration from Horn’s proof-of-concept implementation of
Spectre [13]. By measuring the individual time of each access
instead of the overall access time one can (1) reduce the time
window in which spurious events can pollute the measure-
ments, and (2) count the exact number of cache misses in the
second iteration. While this improves robustness to noise, it
also comes with a cost in terms of the number of executed
instructions.
C. The Distribution of Eviction Sets
In this section we analyze the distribution of eviction sets.
More specifically, we compute the probability that a suitably
a0 a1 ... an-1 a0 a1 an-1...
Test 3: Robust eviction test for an arbitrary address: (1) Access
S = {a0, . . . , an−1}. (2) Access S again, measuring access
time of each element. If the access times of more than a
elements in (2) is above a threshold, S is an eviction set.
chosen set of random virtual addresses forms an eviction set,
for different degrees of adversary control.
Choosing Candidate Sets: For explaining what “suitably
chosen” means, we need to distinguish between the γ set index
bits of the physical addresses that can be controlled from user
space, and the c− γ bits that cannot. The value of γ depends,
for example, on whether we are considering huge or small
pages.
Controlling set index bits from user space is possible be-
cause the virtual-to-physical translation pt acts as the identity
on the page offset, see Section II-B. When trying to find
a minimal eviction set, one only needs to consider virtual
addresses that coincide on those γ bits.
The challenge is to find collisions on the c − γ set index
bits that cannot be controlled from user space (the page color
bits in Figure 1), as well as on the unknown s slice bits. In
this section, we assume that the virtual-to-physical translation
pt acts as a random function on those bits. This assumption
corresponds to the worst case from an adversary’s point of
view; in reality, more detailed knowledge about the translation
can reduce the effort for finding eviction sets [14].
Whenever we speak about “choosing a random set of virtual
addresses” of a given size in this paper, we hence refer to
choosing random virtual addresses that coincide on all γ set
index bits under control. We now determine the probability of
such a set to be an eviction set.
Probability of Colliding Virtual Addresses: We first com-
pute the probability that two virtual addresses y and x that
coincide on the γ user-controlled set index bits are actually
congruent. We call this event a collision and denote it by C.
As pt acts as a random function on the remaining c − γ set
index bits and s slice bits, we have:
P (C) = 2γ−c−s
The following example illustrates how removing adversary
control increases the difficulty of finding collisions on com-
mon cache configurations.
Example 1. Consider the cache from Figure 1 with 8 slices
(i.e. s = 3) of 1024 cache sets each (i.e. c = 10).
• With huge pages (i.e. p = 21), the attacker controls all
of the set index bits, i.e. γ = c, hence the probability of a
collision P (C) = 2−3 is given by the number of slices.
• With pages of 4KB (i.e. p = 12), the number of bits under
control is γ = p − ℓ = 6, hence the probability of finding a
collision is P (C) = 26−10−3 = 2−7.
• The limit case (i.e. p = ℓ = 6) corresponds to an adver-
sary that has no control whatsoever over the mapping of virtual
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addresses to set index bits and slice bits – besides the fact that
a virtual address always maps to the same physical address.
This case corresponds to adding a permutation layer to all
adversary-controlled bits (see, e.g. [7]) and is a candidate for
a countermeasure that makes finding eviction sets intractable.
For this case we obtain P (C) = 2−10−3 = 2−13.
Probability of a Set to be an Eviction Set for x: We analyze
the probability of a set of virtual addresses S to be an eviction
set for a given address x. This probability can be expressed
in terms of a binomially distributed random variable X ∼
B(N, p) with parameters N = |S| and p = P (C). With such
anX , the probability of finding k collisions, i.e., |S ∩ [x]| = k,
is given by:
P (X = k) =
(
N
k
)
pk(1− p)N−k
According to Definition 1, S is an eviction set if it contains
at least a addresses that are congruent with x, see (1). The
probability of this happening is given by:
P (|S ∩ [x]| ≥ a) = 1− P (X < a)
= 1−
a−1∑
k=0
(
N
k
)
pk(1− p)N−k
Figure 3 depicts the distribution of sets to be an eviction
set for x, based on the cache from Figure 1.
Probability of a Set to be an Eviction Set for an arbitrary
address: We analyze the probability that a set S contains at
least a + 1 addresses that map to the same cache set. To this
end, we view the problem as a cell occupancy problem.
Namely, we consider B = 2s+c−γ possible cache sets (or
bins) with N = |S| addresses (or balls) that are uniformly
distributed, and ask for the probability of filling at least one
set (or bin) with more than a addresses (or balls).
We model this probability using random variables
N1, . . . , NB, where Ni represent the number of addresses
mapping to the i-th cache set, with the constraint that N =
N1 + ... + NB . With this, the probability of having at least
one set with more than a addresses can be reduced to the
complementary event of all Ni being less or equal than a:
P (∃i | Ni > a) = 1− P (N1 ≤ a, ..., NB ≤ a)
The right-hand side is a cumulative multinomial distribution,
whose exact combinatorial analysis is expensive for large
values of N and becomes unpractical for our purpose. Instead,
we rely on a well-known approximation based on Poisson
distributions [15] for calculating the probabilities.
Figure 3 depicts the distribution of sets to be an eviction
set for an arbitrary address, based on the cache from Figure 1.
We observe that the probability of the multinomial grows faster
with the set size than the binomial distribution. This shows that
a set is more likely an eviction set for an arbitrary address than
it is for a specific address.
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000
0
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Fig. 3: Probability of random sets to be eviction sets as a
function of their size, based on our theoretical models. We
use P (C) = 2−7 to represent an attacker with 4KB pages
in the machine from Figure 1. The blue-circle line shows the
multinomial model for an “arbitrary” eviction set. The red-
cross line shows the binomial model for an “specific” eviction
set.
Cost of Finding Eviction Sets: We conclude this section
by computing the cost (in terms of the expected number
of memory accesses required) of finding an eviction set of
size N by repeatedly and independently selecting and testing
candidate sets.
To this end, we model the repeated independent choice of
eviction sets as a geometric distribution over the probability
p(N) that a candidate set of size N is an eviction set. The
expectation 1/p(N) of this distribution captures the expected
number of candidate sets that must be tested until we find an
eviction set. Assuming that a test of a set of size N requires
O(N) memory accesses, as in Section III-B, this yields an
overall cost in terms of memory accesses for finding an initial
eviction set of O(N/p(N)).
Fig. 4: Expected number of memory accesses for finding an
eviction set as a function of its size. The dashed blue line
represents P (C) = 2−3, an attacker with huge pages (i.e.
controls all γ = 10 set index bits). The plain orange line
represents P (C) = 2−7, an attacker with 4KB pages (i.e.
controls γ = 6). The dotted green line represents P (C) =
2−13, an attacker w/o any control over the set index bits (i.e.
γ = 0).
Figure 4 depicts the cost function N/p(N) for the adver-
saries from Example 1) for finding eviction sets for a specific
address, and highlights the most favorable sizes for finding
eviction sets. Since probability grows with set size, finding an
eviction set of small size requires, in expectation, large number
of trials. Once the probability stabilizes (i.e. the set is large
enough), we start seeing the linear cost of the test.
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IV. ALGORITHMS FOR COMPUTING MINIMAL EVICTION
SETS
The probability that a set of virtual addresses forms an
eviction set depends on its size, on the cache settings (e.g.,
associativity and number of cache sets), and on the amount
of control an adversary has over the physical addresses. In
particular, a small set of random virtual addresses is unlikely
to be an eviction set. This motivates the two-step approach for
finding minimal eviction sets in which one (1) first identifies a
large eviction set, and (2) then reduces this set to its minimal
core.
Previous proposals in the literature rely on this two-step
approach. In this section we first present the baseline reduction
from the literature, which requires O(N2) memory accesses.
We then show that it is possible to perform the reduction
using only O(N) memory accesses, which enables dealing
with much larger initial eviction sets than before.
The main practical implication of this result is that finding
minimal eviction sets from user (or sandboxed) space is faster
than previously thought, and hence practical even without
any control over the slice or set index bits. This renders
countermeasures based on reducing adversary control over
these bits futile.
A. The Baseline Algorithm
We revisit the baseline algorithm for reducing eviction
sets that has been informally described in the literature. Its
pseudocode is given as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 receives as input a virtual address x and an
eviction set S for x. It proceeds by picking an address c from
S and tests whether S \ {c} is still evicting x, see line 4. If it
is not (notably the if-branch), c must be congruent to x and is
recorded in R, see line 5. The algorithm then removes c from
S in line 7 and loops in line 2.
Note that the eviction test TEST is applied to R∪(S\{c}) in
line 4, i.e. all congruent elements found so far are included.
This enables scanning S for congruent elements even when
there are less than a of them left. The algorithm terminates
when R forms a minimal eviction set of a elements, which is
guaranteed to happen because S is initially an eviction set.
Proposition 1. Algorithm 1 reduces an eviction set S to its
minimal core in O(N2) memory accesses, where N = |S|.
The complexity bound follows because |S| is an upper
bound for the number of loop iterations as well as on the
argument size of Test 1 and hence the number of memory
accesses performed during each call to TEST.
The literature contains different variants of Algorithm 1[4],
[5], [9]. For example, the variant presented in [9] always puts
c back into S and keeps iterating until |S| = a. This still is
asymptotically quadratic, but adds some redundancy that helps
to combat errors.
If the quadratic baseline was optimal, one could think about
preventing an adversary from computing small eviction sets by
reducing or removing control over the set index bits, either by
Algorithm 1 Baseline Reduction
In: S=candidate set, x=victim address
Out: R=minimal eviction set for v
1: R← {}
2: while |R| < a do
3: c← pick(S)
4: if ¬TEST(R ∪ (S \ {c}), x) then
5: R← R ∪ {c}
6: end if
7: S ← S \ {c}
8: end while
9: return R
adding a mask via hardware [5] or a permutation layer via
software [7] (see limit case in Example 1).
B. Computing Minimal Eviction Sets for a Specific Address
We present a novel algorithm that performs the reduction
of eviction sets to their minimal core in O(N) memory
accesses, where N = |S|. This enables dealing with much
larger eviction sets than the quadratic baseline and renders
countermeasures based on hiding the physical address futile.
Our algorithm is based on ideas from threshold group testing,
which we briefly introduce first.
1) Threshold Group Testing: Group testing refers to pro-
cedures that break up the task of identifying elements with
a desired property by tests on sets (i.e. groups of those
elements). Group testing has been proposed for identifying
diseases via blood tests where, by testing pools of blood
samples rather than individual samples, one can reduce the
number of tests required to find all positive individuals from
linear to logarithmic in the population size [16].
Threshold group testing [8] refers to group testing based
on tests that give a negative answer if the number of positive
individuals in the tested set is at most l, a positive answer if
the number is at least u, and any answer if it is in-between l
and u. Here, l and u are natural numbers that represent lower
and upper thresholds, respectively.
2) A Linear-Time Algorithm for Computing Minimal Evic-
tion Sets: The key insight behind our algorithm is that testing
whether a set of virtual addresses S evicts x (see Test 1) can
actually be seen as a threshold group test for congruence with
x, where l = a − 1 and u = a. This is because the test
gives a positive answer if |[x] ∩ S| ≥ a, and a negative answer
otherwise. This connection allows us to leverage the following
result from the group testing literature for computing minimal
eviction sets.
Lemma 1 ([8]). If a set S contains p or more positive
elements, one can identify p of them using O(p log |S|)
threshold group tests with l = p− 1 and u = p.
Proof. The idea behind Lemma 1 is to partition S in p + 1
disjoint subsets T1, . . . , Tp+1 of (approximately) the same size.
A counting argument (see Appendix C) shows that there is at
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Algorithm 2 Reduction Via Group Testing
In : S=candidate set, x=victim address
Out : R=minimal eviction set for x
1: while |S| > a do
2: {T1, ..., Ta+1} ← split(S, a + 1)
3: i← 1
4: while ¬TEST(S \ Ti, x) do
5: i← i+ 1
6: end while
7: S ← S \ Ti
8: end while
9: return S
least one j ∈ {1, . . . , p+1} such that S \Tj is still an eviction
set. One identifies such a j by group tests and repeats the
procedure on S \ Tj . The logarithmic complexity is due to
the fact that |S \ Tj| = |S|
p
p+1 , i.e. each iteration reduces the
eviction set by a factor of its size, rather by than a constant
as in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 computes minimal eviction sets based on this
idea. Note that Lemma 1 gives a bound on the number of
group tests. For computing eviction sets, however, the relevant
complexity measure is the total number of memory accesses
made, i.e. the sum of the sizes of the sets on which tests are
performed. We next show that, with this complexity measure,
Algorithm 2 is linear in the size of the initial eviction set.
Proposition 2. Algorithm 2 with Test 1 reduces an eviction
set S to its minimal core using O(a2N) memory accesses,
where N = |S|.
Proof. The correctness of Algorithm 2 follows from the invari-
ant that S is an eviction set and that it satisfies |S| = a upon
termination, see Lemma 1. For the proof of the complexity
bound observe that the number of memory accesses performed
by Algorithm 2 on a set S of size N follows the following
recurrence.
T (N) = T (N
a
a + 1
) +N · a (2)
for N > a, and T (a) = a. The recurrence holds because, on
input S, the algorithm applies threshold group tests on a + 1
subsets of S, each of size N − N
a+1 . The overall cost for the
split and the tests is N · a. The algorithm recurses on exactly
one of these subsets of S, which has size N a
a+1 . From the
Master theorem [17] it follows that T (N) ∈ Θ(N).
See Appendix B for a direct proof that also includes the
quadratic dependency on associativity.
C. Computing Minimal Eviction Set for an Arbitrary Address
The Algorithms presented so far compute minimal eviction
sets for a specific virtual address x. We now consider the case
of computing minimal eviction sets for an arbitrary address.
This case is interesting because, as shown in Section III-C, a
set of virtual addresses is more likely to evict any arbitrary
address than a specific one. That is, in scenarios where the
target address is not relevant, one can start the reduction with
smaller candidate sets.
The key observation is that both Algorithm 1 and Algo-
rithm 2 can be easily adapted to compute eviction sets for
an arbitrary address. This only requires replacing the eviction
test for a specific address (Test 1) by an eviction test for an
arbitrary address (Test 3).
Proposition 3. Algorithm 1, with Test 3 for an arbitrary
eviction set, reduces an eviction set to its minimal core in
O(N2) memory accesses, where N = |S|.
Proposition 4. Algorithm 2 with Test 3 reduces an eviction
set to its minimal core in O(N) memory accesses, where N =
|S|.
The complexity bounds for computing eviction sets for an
arbitrary address coincide with those in Proposition 1 and 2
because Test 1 and Test 3 are both linear in the size of the
tested set.
D. Computing Minimal Eviction Sets for Many Virtual Ad-
dresses
We now discuss the case of finding eviction sets for a large
number of cache sets. For this we assume a given pool P
of virtual addresses, and explain how to compute minimal
eviction sets for all the eviction sets that are contained in P .
For large enough P the result can be a set of eviction sets for
all virtual addresses.
The core idea is to use a large enough subset of P and
reduce it to a minimal eviction set S for an arbitrary address,
say x. Use S to build a test TEST((S \ {x}) ∪ {y}, x) for
individual addresses y to be congruent with x. Use this test
to scan P and remove all elements that are congruent with x.
Repeat the procedure until no more eviction sets are found in
P . With a linear reduction using Algorithm 2, a linear scan,
and a constant number of cache sets, this procedure requires
O(|P |) memory accesses to identify all eviction sets in P .
Previous work [9] proposes a similar approach based on the
quadratic baseline reduction. The authors leverage the fact that,
on earlier Intel CPUs, given two congruent physical addresses
x ≃ y, then x+∆ ≃ y+∆, for any offset∆ < 2γ . This implies
that, given one eviction set for each of the 2c−γ page colors,
one can immediately obtain 2γ−1 others by adding appropriate
offsets to each address. Unfortunately, with unknown slicing
functions this only holds with probability 2−s, what increases
the attacker’s effort. Our linear-time algorithm helps scaling
to large numbers of eviction sets under those conditions.
Another solution to the problem of finding many eviction
sets has been proposed in [4]. This solution differs from
the two-step approach in that the algorithm first constructs
a so-called conflict set, which is the union of all minimal
eviction sets contained in P , before performing a split into
the individual minimal eviction sets. The main advantage of
using conflict sets is that, once a minimal eviction set is found,
the conflict set need not be scanned for further congruent
addresses.
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V. EVALUATION
In this section we perform an evaluation of the algorithms
for computing minimal eviction sets we have developed in
Section IV. The evaluation complements our theoretical anal-
ysis along two dimensions:
Robustness: The theoretical analysis assumes that tests
for eviction sets always return the correct answer, which
results in provably correct reduction algorithms. In this section
we analyze the robustness of our algorithms in practice. In
particular, we study the influence of factors that are outside
of our model, such as adaptive cache replacement policies
and TLB activity. We identify conditions under which our
algorithms are almost perfectly reliable, as well as conditions
under which their reliability degrades. These insights can
be the basis of principled countermeasures against, or paths
forward for improving robustness of, algorithms for finding
eviction sets.
Execution time: The theoretical analysis captures the
performance of our algorithms in terms of the number of
memory accesses. As for the case of correctness, the real
execution time is influenced by factors that are outside of our
model, such as the total number of cache and TLB misses, or
the implementation details. In our empirical analysis we show
that the number of memory accesses is in fact a good predictor
for the asymptotic real-time performance of our algorithms.
A. Design of our Analysis
Implementation: We implemented the tests and algo-
rithms described in Sections III-B and IV as a command
line tool, which can be parameterized to find minimal evic-
tion sets on different platforms. All of our experiments are
performed using the tool. The source code is available at:
https://github.com/cgvwzq/evsets.
Analyzed Platforms: We evaluate our algorithms on two
different CPUs running Linux 4.9:
1) Intel i5-6500 4 x 3.20GHz (Skylake family), 16GB of
RAM, and a 6MB LLC with 8192 12-way cache sets. Our
experiments indicate that only 10 bits are used as set index
on this machine, we hence conclude that each core has 2
slices. Following our previous notation, i.e.: asky = 12, csky =
10, ssky = 3, ℓsky = 6.
2) Intel i7-4790 8 x 3.60GHzGHz (Haswell family), 8GB
of RAM, and a 8MB LLC with 8192 16-way cache sets. This
machine has 4 physical cores and 4 slices. Following our pre-
vious notation, i.e.: ahas = 16, chas = 11, shas = 2, ℓhas = 6.
We emphasize that all experiments run on machines with user
operating systems (with a default window manager and back-
ground services), default kernel, and default BIOS settings.
Selection of Initial Search Space: We first allocate a big
memory buffer as a pool of addresses from where we can
suitably chose the candidate sets (recall Section III-C). This
choice is done based on the adversary’s capabilities (i.e., γ),
for example, by collecting all addresses in the buffer using a
stride of 2γ+ℓ, and then randomly selecting N of them. With
this method, we are able to simulate any amount of adversary
control over the set index bits, i.e. any γ with γ < p− ℓ.
Isolating and Mitigating Interferences: We identify ways
to isolate two important sources of interference that affect
the reliability of our tests and hence the correctness of our
algorithms:
• Adaptive Replacement Policies: Both Skylake and
Haswell employ mechanisms to adaptively switch between
undocumented cache replacement policies. Our experiments
indicate that Skylake keeps a few fixed cache sets (for example,
the cache set zero) that seem to behave as PLRU and match
the assumptions of our model. Targeting such sets allows us
to isolate the effect of adaptive and unknown replacement
policies on the reliability of our algorithms.
• Translation Lookaside Buffers: Performing virtual mem-
ory translations during a test results in accesses to the TLB.
An increased number of translations can lead to an increased
number of TLB misses, which at the end trigger page walks.
These page walks result in implicit memory accesses that may
evict the target address from the cache, even though the set
under test is not an eviction set, i.e. it introduces a false
positive. TLB misses also introduce a noticeable delay on
time measurements, what has been recently discussed in a
concurrent work [18]. We isolate these effects by performing
experiments for pages of 4KB on huge pages of 2MB, but
under the assumption that, as for 4KB pages, only γ = 6 bits
of the set index are under attacker control.
We further rely on common techniques from the literature
to mitigate the influence of other sources of interference:
• For reducing the effect of hardware prefetching we use
a linked list to represent eviction sets, where each element
is a pointer to the next address. This ensure that all memory
accesses loads are executed in-order. We further randomize the
order of elements.
• For reducing the effect of jitter, we perform several time
measurements per test and compare their average value with
a threshold. In our experiments, 10 − 50 measurements are
sufficient to reduce the interference of context switches and
other spurious events. More noisy environments (e.g. a web
browser) may require larger numbers.
B. Evaluating Robustness
We rely on two indicators for the robustness of our tests
and reduction algorithms:
• The eviction rate, which is the relative frequency of our
tests returning true on randomly selected sets of fixed
size.
• The reduction rate, which we define as the relative fre-
quency of our reduction succeeding to reduce randomly
selected sets of fixed size to a minimal eviction set.
Here, a reduction is successful if the elements it returns are
congruent, i.e., they coincide on the set bits and on the slice
bits. For this check we rely on the reverse engineered slice
function for Intel CPUs [19].
With perfect tests (and hence correct algorithms), both the
eviction rate and the reduction rate should coincide with the
theoretical prediction given in Section III. Our analysis hence
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Fig. 5: Skylake: Eviction for specific address x on cache set zero, compared to our binomial model. Each point is the average
of 1000 reductions for sets of N randomly chosen addresses.
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(a) Eviction and reduction rates for an specific address x targeting
cache set 10, compared to our binomial model.
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(b) Eviction and reduction rates for an arbitrary address, compared
to our multinomial model.
Fig. 6: Experiments on Skylake. Each point is the average of
100 reductions for sets of N randomly chosen addresses.
focuses on deviations of the eviction and reduction rate from
these predictions.
Experimental Results: The experimental results for evic-
tion and reduction for a specific address x are given in
Figures 5 and 6a (for Skylake), and Figure 7a (Haswell).
The results for arbitrary addresses are given in Figures 6b
and 7b (for Skylake and Haswell, respectively). We highlight
the following findings:
• Analysis under idealized conditions We first analyze
our test and reduction algorithms under idealized conditions,
where we use the techniques described in Section V-A to
mitigate the effect of TLBs, complex replacement policies,
prefetching, and jitter. Figure 5 illustrates that, under these
conditions, eviction and reduction rates (Test 1 and Algo-
rithm 2) closely match. Moreover, eviction and reduction rates
closely match the theoretical prediction for small pages.
For huge pages, however, eviction and reduction rates remain
below the theoretical prediction, see Figure 5. We attribute this
to the fact that, using explicit allocations (see Appendix A),
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(a) Eviction and reduction rates for an specific address x, compared
to our binomial model.
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(b) Eviction and reduction rates for an arbitrary address, compared
to our multinomial model.
Fig. 7: Experiments on Haswell. Each point is the average of
100 reductions for sets of N randomly chosen addresses.
huge pages are chosen from a pre-allocated pool of physical
pages that usually resides in a fixed zone. This limits the
uniformity of the more significant bits and deviates from our
uniform modeling.
• Effect of the cache replacement policies. Our experimental
results show that the eviction and reduction rates decrease
significantly on Haswell (Figure 7a), and on Skylake when
targeting a cache set (Figure 6a) different from zero. The effect
is also visible in the evaluation of algorithms for finding an
arbitrary eviction set (see Figures 6b and 7b).
The decrease seems to be caused by two factors: the replace-
ment policy of the targeted cache sets does not match our
models; and the targeted cache set are influenced by accesses
to other sets in the cache. We provide further evidence of this
effect in Section VI.
• Effect of TLB thrashing. Virtual memory translations are
more frequent with small pages than with huge pages, which
shows in our experiments: The eviction rate lies above the
theoretical prediction, in particular for large sets, which shows
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the existence of false positives. In contrast, the reduction rate
falls off. This is because false positives in tests cause the
reduction to select sets that are not eviction sets, which leads
to failure further down the path.
The effect is clearly visible in Figure 5, where we compare the
results on small pages with those on huge pages for cache set
zero on Skylake. We observe that the reduction rate on small
pages declines for N > 1500, which, as Appendix D shows,
coincides with the TLB capacity of Skylake of 1536 entries.
The effect is also visible in Figure 7b , where we attribute
the strong decline of the reduction rate after N > 1000
(Haswell’s TLB capacity is 1024 entries) to implicit memory
accesses having a greater chance to be an eviction set for
Haswell’s adaptive replacement policy. In the rest of figures
the effect is overlaid with interferences of the replacement
policy. However, Figure 6b shows that with large TLBs, and
for most reasonable values of N , the effect of TLB thrashing
is negligible.
C. Evaluating Performance
We evaluate the performance of our novel reduction al-
gorithm and compare it to that of the baseline from the
literature. For this, we measure the average time required to
reduce eviction sets of different sizes to their minimal core.
We first focus on idealized conditions that closely match the
assumptions of the theoretical analysis in Section IV.
To put the performance of the reduction in context, we also
evaluate the effort that is required for finding an initial eviction
set to reduce. For this, we consider attackers with different
capabilities to control the set index bits, based on huge pages
(γ = 10), 4 KB pages (γ = 6), and with no control over the
set index bits (γ = 0).
Together, our evaluation gives an account of how the per-
formance gains of our novel reduction algorithm affect the
overall effort of computing minimal eviction sets.
Experimental Results: The results of the evaluation of
the reduction for a specific address on Skylake are given in
Figure 8. We focus on cache set zero to mitigate the effect of
the replacement policy, and we mitigate the influence of TLBs
and prefetching as described in Section V-A.2
Each data point is based on the average execution time of
10 successful reductions. The sizes of the initial sets (x-axis)
are chosen to depict the range where finding an initial eviction
set does not require picking a too large number of candidate
sets (depicted by the green bars). For a more systematic choice
of the initial set size see the discussion below.
We highlight the following observations:
• The slope of the orange curve clearly illustrates the
quadratic growth of execution time of the naive reduction,
whereas the blue curve shows the linear growth of our novel
algorithms. The absolute values account for constant factors
such as the 50 time measurements per test, and the overhead
due to metrics collection.
2In the limit case the stride of 64B makes inferences by prefetching
prohibitive even with a randomized order, which is why we disable hardware
prefetchers using wrmsr -a 0x1a4 15.
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Fig. 8: The vertical green bars (left axis) depict the average
number of times one needs to pick a set of addresses for
finding an eviction set. Triangles (right axis) show time in
seconds: blue depicts the average execution time of group
test reductions; orange depicts the average execution time of
baseline reductions. Different plots illustrate attackers with
huge pages, 4KB pages, and w/o any control over the set index
bits, respectively.
• For large set sizes, our novel reduction clearly outper-
forms the quadratic baseline. For example, for sets of size
3000, we already observe a performance improvement of a
factor of 10, which shows a clear practical advantage. For
small set sizes, this practical advantage seems less relevant.
For such sizes, however, the number of repetitions required
until find a real eviction set grows, as illustrated by the green
bars. For the total cost of finding an eviction set, both effects
need to be considered in combination.
Optimal Choice of the Initial Set Size: For evaluating the
cost of first identifying and then reducing eviction sets, we rely
on an expression for the overall number of memory accesses
required for finding a minimal eviction set. This expression is
the sum of the expected number Np(N) of memory accesses
for finding an eviction set, see Section III-C, and of the
memory accesses for the respective reductions N2 and N , see
Propositions 1 and 2. Based on this expression, we compute
the optimal set sizes (from an attacker’s perspective) for the
linear and the quadratic reductions. We use these sizes as an
approximation of the optimal use of each reduction algorithm
in the overall pipeline, and we evaluate their execution time
on sets of this size.
Table I shows the comparison of the linear and the quadratic
reductions on sets of optimal size for three different attackers:
with huge pages, with 4KB pages, and in the limit.
We highlight the following observations:
• For huge pages, computing eviction sets is cheap, and the
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Baseline Group Testing
Attacker P (C) N Time N Time
HP (γ = 10) 2−3 62 0.005s 62 0.004s
4KB (γ = 6) 2−7 662 0.179s 862 0.023s
Limit (γ = 0) 2−13 26650 218.651s 53300 1.814s
TABLE I: N shows the optimal set sizes for different attackers
(γ bits) on Skylake (a = 12) using 50 time measurements
per test. Time shows the average execution time of our
implementations of Algorithm 1 (baseline) and Algorithm 2
(group testing) under ideal conditions.
linear-time reduction does not lead to a practical advantage.
• For small pages, the linear-time reduction improves the
cost of computing eviction sets by a factor of more than 7. This
is a significant advantage in practice, as it can make attacks
more stealthy and robust against timing constraints.
• For the limit case, the linear-time reduction improves over
the quadratic baseline by more than two orders of magnitude.
D. Performance in Practice
In this section we give examples of the performance benefits
of our reduction algorithms in real-world scenarios, i.e., in the
presence of TLB noise and adaptive replacement policies.
We implement two heuristics to counter the resulting sub-
optimal reduction rates (see SectionV-A): repeat-until-success,
where we pick a new set and start over after a failed reduction;
and backtracking, where at each level of the computation tree
we store the elements that are discarded, and, in case of error,
go back to a parent node on which the test succeeded to
continue the computation from there. For more details we refer
to our open-source implementation.
For comparing the performance of the reduction algorithms
in the context of these heuristics, we follow the literature
and focus on initial set sizes that guarantee that the initial
set is an eviction set with high probability. This is because
a real-world attacker is likely to forgo the complications of
repeatedly sampling and directly pick a large enough initial
set.
The following examples provide average execution times
(over 100 samples) for different attackers on randomly selected
target cache sets. Skylake (a = 12) using 10 time measure-
ments per test.
• For finding eviction sets with huge pages, previous
work [20] suggests an initial set size of N = 192 which,
according to our binomial model (see Section III-C), yields a
probability of sets to be evicting close to 1. For this size, the
baseline reduction takes 0.014 seconds, while the group-testing
reduction takes 0.003 seconds, i.e. our algorithm improves the
baseline by a factor of 5.
• For finding minimal eviction sets with 4KB pages, previ-
ous work [9] suggests an initial set size of N = 8192, which
amounts to the size of LLC times the number of slices. We
choose an initial set size of N = 3420 for our comparison,
which according to our model provides a probability of being
an eviction set close to 1. For this N , the baseline reduction
takes 5.060 seconds, while the group-testing reduction takes
0.245 seconds, i.e. our algorithm improves the baseline by
a factor of 20. Finding all minimal eviction sets (for a fixed
offset) within this buffer3 requires more than 100 seconds with
the baseline algorithm. With group testing, the same process
takes only 9.339 seconds, i.e. it improves by a factor of 10.
E. Summary
In summary, our experiments show that our algorithms
improve the time required for computing minimal eviction sets
by factors of 5-20 in practical scenarios. Moreover, they show
that finding minimal eviction sets from virtual (or sandboxed)
memory space is fast even without any control over the slice
or set index bits, rendering countermeasures based on masking
these bits futile.
VI. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE EFFECT OF MODERN CACHE
REPLACEMENT POLICIES
There are several features of modern microarchitectures that
are not captured in our model and that can affect the effec-
tiveness of our algorithms, such as adaptive and randomized
replacement policies, TLBs, prefetching, etc. The evaluation
of Section V shows that the influence of prefetching can be
partially mitigated by an adversary, and that the influence of
TLBs is not a limiting factor in practice. The role of the cache
replacement policy is less clear.
In this section, we take a closer look at the role of modern
cache replacement policies in computing minimal eviction
sets. As discussed in Section II, post Sandy Bridge architec-
tures boast replacement policies with features such as adap-
tivity or thrashing-resistance. With such features, accessing
a set of a addresses that are congruent with [x] is neither
necessary nor sufficient for evicting x, which introduces a two-
sided error (false positives and false negatives) in our tests for
congruence. We first explain the key mechanisms that lead to
this error, before we experimentally analyze its influence on
Skylake and Haswell.
A. Adaptive Replacement Policies
Adaptive cache replacement policies [21] dynamically select
the replacement policy depending on which one is likely to
be more effective on a specific load. For this, they rely on so-
called leader sets that implement different policies. A counter
keeps track of the misses incurred on the leaders and adapts the
replacement policy of the follower sets depending on which
leader is more effective at the moment. There are different
ways for selecting the leaders: a static policy in which the
leader sets are fixed; and a rand-runtime policy that randomly
selects different leaders every few millions instructions.
A previous study indicates that the replacement mechanism
used in Ivy Bridge is indeed adaptive, with static leader
sets [11]. To the best of our knowledge, there is no detailed
study of replacement mechanisms on more recent generations
of Intel processors such as Haswell, Broadwell, or Skylake,
but there are mentions of high-frequency policy switches on
3We empirically observe that on Skylake, this size is sufficient to contain
eviction sets for most of the 128 different cache sets for a fixed offset.
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Fig. 9: Skylake’s eviction and reduction rates per set index. With a stride of 4KB and a total of 4000 addresses (most of them
non-congruent). The number of sets in-between two leaders is either 32 or 98. We rely on huge pages to precisely control the
target’s set index bits.
Haswell and Broadwell CPUs as an obstacle for prime+probe
attacks [9].
We perform different experiments to shed more light on the
implementations of adaptivity in Skylake and Haswell, and on
their influence on computing minimal eviction sets. To this
end, we track eviction and reduction rates (see Section V) for
each of the set indexes individually
1) on arbitrary eviction sets
2) on eviction sets in which all addresses are partially
congruent.
In the second case, the reduction uses only addresses belong-
ing to a single cache set per slice. Assuming independence
of cache sets across slice, a comparison with the first case
allows us to identify the influence across cache sets. For
both experiments we rely on huge pages in order to precisely
control the targeted cache set and reduce the effect of the TLB,
see Section V-A.
B. Evaluating the Effect of Adaptivity
The results for reducing arbitrary eviction sets on Skylake
are given in Figure 9, the results for Haswell are given in
Figure 10. We focus on initial eviction sets of size N = 4000
(but observe similar results for other set sizes). We highlight
the following findings:
Fig. 10: Haswell’s eviction and reduction rates per set index.
With a stride of 4KB and a total of 4000 addresses (most of
them non-congruent).
• Skylake seems to implement an adaptive replacement
mechanism with static leader sets, much like Ivy Bridge. In
particular, we identify a subset of 16 (out of 1024 per slice)
(a) Skylake’s eviction and reduction rates per set index, based on a
stride of 64KB (only partially congruent addresses).
(b) Haswell’s eviction rate and reduction rate per set index, based on
a stride of 128KB (only partially congruent addresses).
Fig. 11: Eviction rate and reduction rate per set index for initial
sets of 4000 partially congruent addresses.
sets where the reduction rate is consistently above 95% and
where tests consistently evict the target address according to
our model (i.e. without false positives and false negatives). On
the follower sets the reduction rate quickly falls off despite a
high eviction rate, indicating that the test can produce both
false positives and false negatives.
• In contrast to Skylake, on Haswell we are not able to
identify any leader sets with consistently high reduction rates,
which suggests a dynamic leader selection policy is in place.
The results of our reductions on partially congruent eviction
sets on Haswell and Skylake are given in Figure 11. They show
that eviction and reduction rates are close to the predicted
optimum. This improves over the reduction rate in Figure 9
and 10, and indicates a strong interference on the eviction
test when accessing neighboring cache sets. In particular, we
observe that the robustness of the reduction increases with
the proportion of partially congruent addresses in the initial
eviction set.
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Fig. 12: Skylake’s total execution time per set index using backtracking and repeat-until-success. Average time over 100 samples,
all of them successful. Stride of 4KB (simulate adversary) and initial set of 4000 addresses (most of them non-congruent). The
lowest execution times (below 0.12s), correspond to sets with higher reduction rate. Horizontal line shows the overall average
execution time.
Finally, Figure 12 depicts the average execution time, in-
cluding the overhead of the backtracking heuristic, of finding
a minimal eviction set for each cache set index. A lower
reduction rate implies a higher number of errors, and hence
more backtracking steps and a longer execution time. This
effect is visible when comparing with Figure 9: cache sets with
the highest reduction rates have the lowest execution times.4
C. Future Work
A more detailed analysis of the algorithmic implications
of adaptive cache replacement policies is out of the scope of
this paper. However, we briefly describe some ideas for future
work:
• Controlling the policy. A better understanding of adap-
tivity mechanisms could be exploited to augment the number
of followers that behave deterministically, and hence facilitate
the reduction. For instance, once we find eviction sets for a
leader set on Skylake, a parallel thread could produce hits on
that set (or misses on another leader), ensuring that it keeps
the lead.
• Group testing. Work on noisy group testing [22], or
threshold group testing with gap [8], can provide useful tools
for dealing with the uncertainty about the exact behavior of
modern microarchitectures.
VII. RELATED WORK
Computing minimal, or at least small, eviction sets pro-
vides an essential primitive for removing or placing arbitrary
data in the cache, which is essential for LLC cache attacks
(Prime+Probe [4], Evict+Reload [23], etc.), for DRAM fault
attacks (such as Rowhammer [24], [2], which break the sep-
aration between security domains), for memory-deduplication
attacks (such as VUSION [25]), as well as for the recent
Meltdown [26] and Spectre [3] attacks (which use the cache
4The plot also shows two different clusters of execution times, for which
we currently lack a satisfying explanation.
to leak data across boundaries and to increase the number of
speculatively executed instructions).
Gruss et al. [6] already identified dynamic and static
approaches for finding eviction sets. The dynamic method
uses timing measurements to identify colliding addresses
without any knowledge about the LLC slicing hash function
or the physical addresses; whereas the static method use
the reverse engineered hash and (partial) information about
the physical addresses to compute eviction sets. In practice,
most attacks [20] rely in a hybrid approach, producing a
partially congruent set of addresses with static methods, and
pruning or reducing the results with a dynamic method (mostly
variants of Algorithm 1). We review some of the most relevant
approaches:
Fully static, without slicing: In CPUs without slicing
(such as ARM) it is possible to find eviction sets directly using
the information from the pagemap interface. Lipp et al. [27]
explore how to perform Prime+Probe, Evict+Reload, and other
cross-core cache attacks on ARM. Fortunately, Google patched
Android in March 2016 5, and now it requires root privileges
to disclose physical addresses, difficulting the task of finding
eviction sets.
Static/Dynamic with huge pages: Liu et al. [4] and
Irazoqui et al. [5], in their seminal work on attacks against
LLC, rely on 2MB huge pages to circumvent the problem of
mapping virtual addresses into cache sets. They are the first
to propose this method.
Gruss et al. [6] present the first rowhammer attack from
JavaScript. To achieve this, they build eviction sets thanks to
2MB huge pages (provided by some Linux distributions with
transparent huge pages support, see Appendix A).
On the other hand, more sophisticated cache attacks from
Intel’s SGX [28] rely on the predictable physical allocation
of large arrays within SGX enclaves, and on the information
extracted from another side-channel in DRAM row’s buffers.
5Android patch: https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2016-03-01
13
Sandboxed environments without huge pages: Oren et
al. [9] present an extension to Liu et al.’s work, carrying out the
first cache attack from JavaScript, where regular 4KB pages
are used and pointers are not directly available. It exploits
the knowledge of browser’s page aligned allocation for large
buffers to construct an initial set with identical page offset
bits. Then they leverage the clever technique described in
Section IV-D for further accelerating the process of finding
other eviction sets.
Dedup Est Machina [14] also implements a JavaScript
rowhammer attack, but this time targeting Microsoft Edge
on Windows 10. Interestingly, they can not rely on large
pages, since Microsoft Edge does not explicitly request them.
However, they discover that the Windows kernel dispenses
pages for large allocations from different physical memory
pools that frequently belong to the same cache sets. Thereby,
they are able to efficiently find eviction sets (not minimal) by
accessing several addresses that are 128KB apart (and often
land in the same cache set).
Horn’s [13] breaks virtual machine isolation using a heuris-
tic to find small eviction sets by iterating over Test 3 several
times, and discarding all elements that are always hot (i.e.
always produce cache hits). While this heuristic performs
extremely well in practice, its asymptotic cost is quadratic on
the set size.
Finally, a more recent work on cache attacks from portable
code [18] (PNaCl and WebAssembly) discusses the problem
of finding eviction sets on regular 4KB pages and how to
partially deal with TLB thrashing.
In contrast to these approaches, our work is the first to
consider adversaries with less than 12 bits of control over
the physical addresses, it formalizes the problem of finding
eviction sets, and provides new techniques that might enable
purely dynamic approaches.
Reverse engineering of slicing functions: Modern CPUs 6
with LLC slicing use proprietary hash functions for distribut-
ing blocks into slices, which lead to attempts to reverse
engineer them. These works are based on: 1) allocating and
identifying sets of colliding addresses [30], [19]; and 2) recon-
structing the slice function using the hamming distance [31],
or solving systems of equations [32], between these addresses.
Even though we now know the slice hash function for several
microarchitectures, and Maurice et al. [20] leverage it to speed
up the finding of eviction sets with huge pages, we believe that
its use on real attacks is hindered by constrained environments
with scarce information about the physical addresses.
Thrashing/scanning resistant replacement policies: Mod-
ern replacement policies such as insertion policies [33] or
DRRIP [10], are known to perform better than PLRU against
workloads causing scanning or thrashing. However, they also
make eviction less reliable, and fall outside our current models
(see Section III). Howg [11] proposes a dual pointer chasing
6According to Intel’s Architecture Reference Manual [29] (see 2.4.5.3 Ring
Interconnect and Last Level Cache), Sandy Bridge is the first generation with
slicing.
to mitigate these effects; and Gruss et al. [6] generalize the ap-
proach with eviction strategies, which are access patterns over
eviction sets that increase the chance of eviction under some
unknown modern policies. Both approaches are orthogonal to
our in that they already assume the possession of eviction sets.
Set index randomization: Concurrent work proposes
some new designs for randomized caches [34], [35], where
cache sets are indexed with a keyed function that completely
voids any attacker control over the physical address bits. A key
result of these proposals is that they make cache-based attacks,
and specially finding small eviction sets, more difficult. Their
security analysis, however, considers quadratic attackers; it
will be interesting to see how it is affected by our linear-time
algorithm.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Finding small eviction sets is a fundamental step in many
microarchitectural attacks. In this paper we perform the first
study of finding eviction sets as an algorithmic problem.
Our core theoretical contribution are novel algorithms that
enable computing eviction sets in linear time, improving over
the quadratic state-of-the-art. Our core practical contribution
is a rigorous empirical evaluation in which we identify and
isolate factors that affect their reliability in practice, such as
adaptive replacement strategies and TLB thrashing.
Our results demonstrate that our algorithms enable finding
small eviction sets much faster than before, enabling attacks
under scenarios that were previously deemed impractical.
They also exhibit conditions under which the algorithms fail,
providing a basis for research on principled countermeasures.
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APPENDIX
A. Huge Pages
Modern operating systems implement support for large
buffers of virtual memory to be mapped into contiguous
physical chunks of 2MB (or 1GB), instead that of regular
4KB. These large chunks are called huge pages. On one hand,
huge pages save page walks when traversing arrays of more
than 4KB, improving performance. On the other hand, they
increase the risk of memory fragmentation, what might lead
to wasting resources.
On Linux systems, huge pages can be demanded explicitly
or implicitly:
• Explicit requests are done by passing special flags to the
allocation routine (e.g. flag MAP_HUGETLB to the mmap
function). In order to satisfy these requests, the OS pre-
allocates a pool of physical huge pages of configurable
size (which by default is 0 in most systems).
• Implicit requests are referred as transparent huge
pages [36]. THPs are implement with a kernel thread
that, similarly to a garbage collector, periodically searches
for enough contiguous 4KB virtual pages that can be re-
mapped into a free 2MB chunk of contiguous physical
memory (reducing PTs size). THP can be configured as:
always, meaning that all memory allocations can be re-
mapped; never, for disabling it; and madvise, where
the programmer needs to signal preference for being re-
mapped via some flags (note that this is not a guarantee).
On other systems huge pages are implement differently,
but the effect is generally the same. For instance, BSD’s
documentation refers to them as super pages, while Windows
calls them large pages.
Interestingly, memory allocations in modern browsers are
not backed by huge pages unless the system is configured
with THP set to always. Hence, relying on them for finding
eviction sets is not feasible in most default systems.
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B. Proof of Proposition 2
In the worst case, we access a+1 different a-subsets groups
of size n
a+1 each, and safely discard
n
a+1 elements that are not
part of the minimal eviction set. We first express recurrence (2)
as a summation
T (n) = an+ an(
a
a + 1
) + an(
a
a + 1
)2 + ...+ an(
a
a + 1
)k
Our termination condition is n( a
a+1 )
k < a, meaning that
we already have an minimal eviction set. By using the
logarithm we can set the exponent of the last iteration as
k = log
a/(a+1) a/n, which allows us to define the function
as a geometric progression
T (n) = a
i=k∑
i=1
n(
a
a + 1
)i−1 =
an(1 − ( a
a+1 )
log
a/(a+1)a/n)
1− a
a+1
The logarithm in the exponent cancels out, and we obtain
T (n) =
an(1 − an )
1− a
a+1
= a(n−a)(a+1) = a2n+an−a3−a2
For simplicity we ignore the effect of the ceiling operator
required in a real implementation, where n is always an
integer. It can be shown that this error is bounded by a small
factor of our k, so we consider it negligible.
C. Pidgeonhole Principle
Proposition 5. Let |S ∩ P | ≥ a and let T1, . . . , Ta+1 be a
partition of S. Then there is i ∈ {1, . . . , a + 1} such that
|(S \ Ti) ∩ P | ≥ a
Proof. When |S ∩ P | = a, one of the a + 1 blocks of the
partition must have an empty intersection with P , say Tj . Then
|(S \ Tj) ∩ P | = |S ∩ P | = a.
When |S ∩ P | > a, assume for contradiction that
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , a + 1} : |(S \ Ti) ∩ P | < a . (3)
We introduce the following notation: pi = |Ti ∩ P | and x =
|S ∩ P |. With this, (3) can be reformulated as
∀i : x− pi < a
Summing over all i we obtain
(a + 1)x− x = ax < (a + 1)a ,
which contradicts the assumption that x > a.
D. Intel’s TLBs
Modern CPUs have very distinct TLBs implementations. In
particular, modern Intel CPUs implement different buffers for
data (dTLB) and instructions (iTLB), a second level TLBs
(sTLB) with larger capacity, and different TLBs for each PT
level.
Table II shows a summary of TLB parameters for Haswell
and Skylake families:
Haswell Skylake
iTLB 4K 128 entries; 4-way 128 entries; 8-way
iTLB 2M/4M 8 entries; full 8 entries; full
dTLB 4K 64 entries; full 64 entries; 4-way
dTLB 2M/4M 32 entries; 4-way 32 entries; 4-way
dTLB 1G 4 entries; 4-way 4 entries; full
sTLB 4K/2M 1024 entries; 8-way 1536 entries; 4-way
sTLB 1G - 16 entries; 4-way
TABLE II: TLB implementation information for Haswell
and Skylake microarchitectures. Extracted from the Intel’s
Architectures Optimization Manual [29].
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